03090nas a2200313 4500008003900000022001300039245012300052210006900175260001200244300001400256490000700270520212400277653001002401653002402411653002802435653001302463100002402476700002002500700001202520700002302532700001402555700002502569700001702594700001402611700002502625700002502650700002502675856007602700 2014 d a0928765500aDoes a detailed model of the electricity grid matter? Estimating the impacts of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative0 aDoes a detailed model of the electricity grid matter Estimating c01/2014 a191 - 2070 v363 aThe consequences of environmental and energy policies in the U.S. can be severely constrained by physical limits of the electric power grid. Flows do not follow the shortest path but are distributed over all lines in accordance with the laws of physics, so grid operators must select which generation units to operate at each moment, not only to minimize production costs, but also to prevent the system from collapsing because of line overloads. Because of the complexity of power grid operation, computing limitations have until very recently made it impossible to solve a policy analysis or planning model that combines realistic modeling of flows with a detailed transmission system model and the prediction of generator investment and retirement. We construct and solve a model of the eastern US and Canada that combines these characteristics. Then, because a smaller model would be usable for some additional purposes, we explore the effects of transmission model simplification on the accuracy of simulation results. To evaluate the amount of detail necessary, we simulate the short- and long-term effects of imposing a price on the carbon dioxide emissions from the power plants in nine northeastern US states, as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative does. We consider three grid models that simplify the actual 62,000-node system to varying degrees. Our 5000-node model matches the 62,000-node model very closely. We use it as the basis for evaluating the more simplified models: a 300-node model and a model with just one node, i.e. no transmission constraints. With each of the three models, we predict the carbon dioxide emission impacts, electricity price impacts, and generator entry and exit impacts of the emission price, over the next 20 years. We find that most of the impact predictions produced by the 300- and one-node models differ from those of the 5000-node model by more than 20%, and some by much more. Fortunately, the 5000-node model, and others with its combination of transmission detail, realistic flows, entry prediction, and retirement prediction can be used for many useful purposes.10aCERTS10aelectricity markets10areliability and markets10aRM11-0051 aShawhan, Daniel, L.1 aTaber, John, T.1 aShi, Di1 aZimmerman, Ray, D.1 aYan, Jubo1 aMarquet, Charles, M.1 aQi, Yingying1 aMao, Biao1 aSchuler, Richard, E.1 aSchulze, William, D.1 aTylavsky, Daniel, J. uhttps://certs.lbl.gov/publications/does-detailed-model-electricity-grid01450nas a2200241 4500008003900000245007500039210006900114260001200183490000700195520068800202653001000890653002400900653001800924653002700942653002800969100001800997700002501015700002301040700002101063700002501084700002501109856007401134 2010 d00aEfficient Market Design and Public Goods, Part II: Theoretical Results0 aEfficient Market Design and Public Goods Part II Theoretical Res c01/20100 v113 aElectric power is traditionally comprised of valued services, including real and reactive power, voltage, frequency and reliability in its most general sense. In this second part of our two-part paper we show mathematically that of these, only real and reactive power are purely private goods, in that power consumed by one customer cannot be used by another and customers can be excluded from receiving any power. The other ancillary services, including voltage, frequency and reliability are shown to be public goods. The first order conditions presented clearly illustrate that the public goods occurring in electric power systems comprise a significant problem for market design.10aCERTS10aelectricity markets10amarket design10apower system economics10areliability and markets1 aToomey, David1 aSchulze, William, D.1 aThomas, Robert, J.1 aThorp, James, S.1 aTylavsky, Daniel, J.1 aSchuler, Richard, E. uhttps://certs.lbl.gov/publications/efficient-market-design-and-public